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Summary 
Major differences between national financial systems might make a common monetary policy 
difficult. As within Europe, Germany and the United Kingdom differ most with respect to their 
financial systems, the present paper addresses its topic under the assumption that the United 
Kingdom is already a part of EMU.  
Employing a comprehensive  concept of a financial system, the author shows that there are indeed 
profound differences between the national financial systems of Germany and the United Kingdom. 
But he argues that these differences are not likely to create great problems for a common monetary 
policy.  
In the context of the present paper, one important difference between the two financial systems 
refers to the structure of the respective financial sector and, as a consequence, to the strength with 
which a given monetary policy impulse set by the central bank is passed on to the financial sector. 
The other important difference refers to the typical relationship between the banks and the business 
sector in each country which determines to what extent the financial sectors and especially the 
banks pass on pressure exerted on them by a monetary policy authority to their clients in their 
national business sector.  
In Germany, the central bank has a stronger influence on the financial sector than in England, 
while, for systemic reasons, German banks tend to soften monetary policy pressures on their 
customers more than British banks do. As far as the transmission of a restrictive monetary policy of 
the ECB to the real economy is concerned, these two differences tend to offset each other. This is 
good news for the advocates of  a monetary union as it eases the task of the ECB when it comes to 
determining the strength of its monetary policy measures. 
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1. Introduction   
There are three main issues which must be discussed if one wishes to answer the question 
which the organisers of this conference have asked me to address:  
(1) Which features of a financial system are important for monetary policy or, in other words, 
how is monetary policy conducted, and how does it affect the real economy, and how and 
to what extent does this depend on the specific features of an economy? 
(2) How different are the financial sectors – or more generally: the financial systems – in 
Europe?  
(3) If significant differences existed between countries, would this have consequences for 
how monetary policy should, and can, be conducted in a common currency framework?  
I want to warn the readers at the outset that I am not a financial macroeconomist and 
apologise to my discussants for this fact. Because this is not may field of specialisation, my 
knowledge of how monetary policy is conducted and how it affects the real economy - that is, 
of the so-called transmission mechanism - is only superficial. I can only hope that this does 
not invalidate all that I would like to offer in my attempt to fulfil the role assigned to me as a 
microeconomically oriented scholar in banking and business finance. In order to clarify the 
basis on which I stand, I want to first present two simple ideas about why differences between 
the national financial systems in Europe might matter for monetary policy in "Euroland".  
In essence, I see monetary policy and its effects as follows: There is a central bank which has 
the ability to provide a monetary policy impulse: The central bank can, for instance, raise the 
short-term interest rate or reduce the quantity of central bank money in the economy (and will 
typically do both at the same time). This impulse has immediate consequences for the interest 
rate structure and the quantity of money (according to some specific definition of a monetary 
aggregate) in the economy and for the banking sector. To the extent that banks refinance 
themselves, or hold voluntary or compulsory reserves, at the central bank, they have less 
funds to offer to their potential borrowers and/or lending becomes more costly to them. The 
resulting change in the situation of the banking sector has, in turn, consequences for the real 
economy to the extent that the firms, households and government bodies that want to borrow 
from the banks have less credit available, or have to pay more for the funds borrowed from 
the banking sector. The restrictive monetary policy impulse thus works itself through the 
system and determines aggregate demand and ultimately output and income, and possibly the 
price level as well. Some details of this process have to be left for further discussion, but 
evidently I assume that monetary policy is effective, at least in the short run.    
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The second idea is taken from a paper by Dornbusch et al.(1998): Differences between the 
national financial systems might matter because different national economies might react 
differently to monetary policy impulses of a given kind and size. If this is so, it might be the 
cast because of differences in the ways in which central bank action influences the respective 
financial sectors and in particular the banking sectors, or because of differences in the ways in 
which a change in the situation of the financial sectors affects the real economy. If there are 
two countries A and B in a monetary union, with A being more sensitive to  monetary policy 
impulses than B, then a given monetary policy measure might be too strong for country A and 
too weak for country B even if it is just right for the intended effect on the (weighted) average 
the two economies in terms of, say, their inflation rates.  
If I may claim any comparative advantage at all for discussing the consequences of national 
differences for EMU, it has to do with the second question - that is, the differences between 
the financial systems in Europe.
3 However, here I must also make two reservations:  
From the way I have formulated the title of my paper and the questions listed above, it can be 
seen that I will not confine myself to looking at differences between financial sectors, but 
wish to, and I will later show that I need to, discuss differences between national financial 
systems. This is not simply a terminological difference, but a difference in substance. I use the 
term financial sector in a narrow way: It denotes those specialised institutions such as banks, 
pension funds, securities markets etc. which provide financial services to the non-financial 
sectors of the economy, and to the ways in which these institutions are shaped and managed 
and how they operate and are regulated. The term financial system encompasses not only the 
financial sector, but also the real sectors to the extent that they demand the financial services 
of the financial sector and also to the extent to which they forego using the financial sector, as 
well as the interaction between the demand for and the supply of the services of the financial 
sector. Thus for instance the extent to which internal financing of investment takes place, the 
extent to which saving takes the form of real investment, the extent to which banking services 
are appropriate to the demand for them etc., are features of a given financial system.
4  
                                                 
3 There is a growing body of econometric literature on differences regarding the monetary transmission 
mechanisms in European countries (see for instance BIS (1995), Dornbusch et al. (1998), Britton/Whitley 
(1997), Ramaswamy/Sloek (1997) and Giovanetti/Marimon (1998)). To me this literature, which is partly 
surveyed in Dornbusch et al. (1998), does not provide unambiguous evidence of great differences in the 
transmission mechanisms. However, to the extent that these papers discuss differences between national 
financial systems at all, they do not go very far in this respect. But see Kashyap/Stein (1997a) who follow a 
similar approach to the one in the present paper. 
4 See Schmidt/Tyrell (1997) for this terminological distinction.  
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The second reservation refers to the countries which I will take into consideration. Anticipat-
ing a likely future course of events, I will assume that the United Kingdom is already part of 
the EMU. Moreover, my empirical references will be mainly restricted to the three largest 
financial systems in the "enlarged EMU", namely those of France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom. Even if the Italian economy were larger than that of Great Britain, I would wish to 
include that of the United Kingdom because, as I will describe below, its financial system 
differs markedly from those of the continental European economies, and from that of 
Germany in particular. An understanding of these differences helps to underscore the hetero-
geneity that makes for national diversity, and for possible problems of a common monetary 
policy, in the EMU.  
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section I shall discuss the transmission mecha-
nisms. Given my background, it appears almost self-evident to me that the so-called credit 
channel is important,
5 though not so much as an alternative to the "conventional" channels of 
the transmission of monetary policy, but rather as a complement to them. The discussion of 
the various channels serves the purpose of providing the criterion for selecting those aspects 
of national financial systems which I will then go on to characterise in some detail. In section 
3, I will argue that the financial systems – as well as the financial sectors – of the three 
countries are vastly different, and point out the main differences. In section 4, I will bring the 
two lines of reasoning together and argue that, in spite of what I perceive as important 
differences, I do not think that these differences matter very much for the design and conduct 
of a common monetary policy. The main reason for this is that what I consider to be the 
characteristic features of the different financial systems – though not of the different financial 
sectors – might have two effects on the functioning of monetary policy which tend to offset 
each other.  
 
2. Transmission mechanisms or channels of monetary policy   
2.1  The classification of channels           
As the name suggests, a transmission mechanism is a conceptual or formal model of the ways 
through which monetary policy influences the real economy. These ways are complicated 
                                                 
5 See already Schmidt (1990).   
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and, as far as I can judge, still imperfectly understood. In the relevant literature, four different 
transmission mechanisms or channels are distinguished.
6 These are 
a) the interest rate channel 
b) the channel of relative prices  
c) the exchange rate channel, and  
d) the credit channel.  
The interest rate channel (a) and to a certain extent also the channel of relative prices (b) are 
standard elements of what may be regarded as the traditional view of the transmission mecha-
nism. The exchange rate channel (c) is not relevant in the context of the present paper, as the 
– enlarged – EMU area is a very large economy for which exchange rates are not a terribly 
important factor because external trade accounts for only a relatively small share of total 
GDP. The credit channel (d) is the "newcomer" in the market of ideas and by now the main 
"competitor" to the incumbents (a) and (b).  
 
2.2. The interest rate channel and the channel of relative prices     
The interest rate channel is based on the conventional Keynesian IS/LM-model. According to 
this model, the central bank determines short-term interest rates. With given and unchanged 
expectations about the inflation rate, this also has an effect on real longer-term interest rates, 
which determine the investment decisions of profit maximising firms, as the firms compare 
marginal internal rates of return on their investment projects with "the cost of capital" when 
they decide whether to invest or not. Similar considerations apply to certain consumption 
decisions
7, so that an unexpected change in that interest rate which the central bank can set 
influences aggregate demand and ultimately also output. Given that prices are inflexible only 
in the short run – not only by definition, but also in reality – an expansionary or restrictive 
monetary policy impulse provided by the central bank loses its effect on the real economy 
over the course of time when prices start to react.  
In order for the interest rate channel to function, two conditions must be met: For one thing, 
monetary policy must not only affect short-term interest rates but also (real) medium to long-
term rates, and, for another, investment decisions must be interest-elastic. Differences 
between financial sectors and, more generally, financial systems, can translate into differences 
                                                 
6 See for instance the articles by Bernanke/Gertler (1995), Meltzer (1995), Mishkin (1995) and Taylor (1995) in 
the Journal of Economic Perspectives symposium on monetary transmission mechanism, and Goodhart (1989) , 
Cecchetti (1995) and Illing (1997) pp.145ff, for overviews. 
7 Especially to households' decisions concerning the acquisition of homes and of consumer durables.  
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in terms of the strength of the links between nominal short-term and real longer-term interest 
rates and in terms of the strength of the links between these rates and investment and con-
sumption decisions. The effects of monetary policy are stronger if financial contracts and in 
particular the terms over which interest rates are contractually fixed are shorter and thus more 
easily adjusted. Another factor which may influence the effectiveness of monetary policy, as 
its working is described in the interest rate channel view, is the extent to which central bank 
money is being used in the economy.  
The channel of relative prices (b) – which is also sometimes called asset price channel, which 
is presented in two different versions in the literature, namely in the "monetarist" version and 
that developed by Tobin (1969) - assumes that central banks influence the composition and/or 
prices of the assets which are held in the portfolios of economic agents. An unexpected 
monetary policy impulse disturbs the equilibrium composition of the portfolios and induces 
attempts to adjust their composition. Ultimately, an expansion of the monetary base by open 
market operations leads to more demand for securities, to rising security prices and thus fal-
ling interest rates and possibly also to an increase in consumption and investment expenditure. 
The extent to which these effects on asset prices merely lead to price level changes, or also to 
real effects, depends on the rigidity of prices and the "disturbances" which may arise from 
changes in the expectations concerning the future monetary policy. The two versions men-
tioned above differ with respect to the asset categories which the agents try to bring into 
balance and their respective rates of return and also as regards the extent to which the process 
of the restructuring portfolios directly affects the demand for real vs. financial assets and thus 
investment decisions.  
According to the proponents of the asset price channel, the main instrument of the central 
bank is its influence on the quantity of central bank money in the economy. This suggests that 
different procedures in which central banks operate in practice, and in particular differences in 
terms of the types of financial assets which are eligible as reserves may lead to differences in 
the effectiveness of monetary policy. However, even also including the United Kingdom, the 
differences between the various economies in Europe which existed in these respects in the 
past, are giving way to a common approach.
8 Another aspect, and one in which the various 
European economies still differ considerably and which is important for this channel, is the 
extent to which the agents hold financial assets whose prices may vary in reaction to central 
bank policy. The larger the share of such financial asset in agents' portfolios, the greater will 
                                                 
8 See Borio (1997) for an exhaustive analysis of different monetary policy procedures and their recent 
convergence.  
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be the likelihood that central bank impulses will work in the ways postulated by the advocates 
of the asset price channel.
9  
It appears plausible that monetary policy is able to have an effect on the real economy 
primarily because of interest effects and also, to a certain extent, because of asset price 
effects. However, the recent empirical literature argues that in reality the effects of monetary 
policy, in particular those of a monetary contraction, are stronger and of a different pattern 
than those which could be expected if the interest rate and asset price channels were the only 
relevant mechanisms, and also that they exhibit a different pattern than the effects one would 
expect to encounter if these were the only pertinent mechanisms.
10 At a theoretical level, the 
interest and the asset price channels assume that the agents in the economy behave in an 
overly mechanistic fashion, and fail to address directly the question of how the financial 
sector, and in particular the banks, react to monetary policy impulses. These two weaknesses 
suggest that looking only at the traditional channels might prevent one from acquiring a 
deeper understanding of the implications of inter-country differences for a common monetary 
policy.  
 
2.3. The credit channel         
At the heart of the so-called credit channel are those aspects which are largely left out by the 
two traditional channels. Because of the information and incentive problems which are widely 
discussed in the current corporate finance literature, financial systems do not function in a 
frictionless manner, and for many non-financial firms external financing is simply difficult to 
obtain and more costly than internal financing. The cost difference is called the "external 
finance premium". In the relevant theoretical and empirical literature this external finance 
premium is assumed to be not only an expense incurred in addition to the basic interest costs, 
but also a positive function of the interest rate. In other words, if the central bank raises or 
lowers "the interest rate", the external finance premium will also go up or down.
 11  
The second aspect which is highlighted in the credit channel view of the transmission mecha-
nism comprises the availability of bank credit and the specific quality, i.e. the limited substi-
tutability, of bank credit. Working in combination, the external finance premium and the 
availability of bank credit strengthen the effectiveness of monetary policy considerably, and it 
                                                 
9 See Meltzer (1995). 
10 See Bernanke/Gertler (1995) for this argument. 
11 For surveys of this transmission channel with empirical results for the U.S. see also Bernanke/Gertler/ 
Gilchrist (1996) and Kashyap/Stein (1997b).  
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seems thoroughly plausible to assume that these two factors may differ much more between 
countries than those at which the traditional views of the transmission mechanism focus.  
As this brief introduction suggests, the credit channel can be broken down into two separate 
but complementary channels. The first one, the broader of the two, is called the balance sheet 
channel. It focuses on the ability to borrow. The external finance premium for a given 
borrower is determined by its financial position, in particular by its net worth, and the value of 
the collateral which it can provide. The borrower's financial position is influenced by the 
monetary policy and by the business cycle. A restrictive monetary policy raises the interest 
rates, reduces the cash flow of firms and depresses net asset values of borrowers and the value 
of their collateral, and may thus severely restrict their financing options and raise the 
premium. The likely consequence is a reduction of investment and in particular of investment 
in working capital, which is typically financed by short-term bank credit. Due to economy-
wide accelerator effects, the impact of a monetary contraction may not only be stronger, it 
may also last longer than the traditional view suggests.
12  
The second "branch" of the credit channel is the more narrowly defined bank lending channel. 
Its proponents proceed from the highly plausible assumption that the central bank is in a posi-
tion to limit the quantity of credit which the banking sector can provide to borrowers. A 
restriction or rationing of bank credit in turn restricts the scope of firm investment; and this is 
all the more likely the less bank credit can be substituted by other sources of funding at the 
bank and firm level. In claiming that bank credit is indeed difficult and in some cases even 
impossible to substitute as it provides a certain liquidity insurance, advocates of the credit 
channel of the transmission mechanism borrow heavily from the recent advances in the theory 
of financial intermediation which shows why "bank loans are unique"
13. Banks are specialists 
in lending to firms in those cases in which it is important to monitor the borrower carefully or, 
in other words, in overcoming information and incentive problems.  
The balance sheet channel and the bank lending channel, moreover, interact in such a way that 
the effects of monetary policy on the ability of firms to borrow from banks and on the ability 
of banks to lend, reinforce each other. This makes their relevance for the effects of monetary 
policy all the greater. As these brief explanations suggest, it would be wrong to consider the 
credit channel as an outright alternative to the interest rate channel. Instead, the effects of bor-
rowing capacity and the availability of bank credit which this channel emphasises reinforce  
                                                 
12 See Bernanke/Gertler/Gilchrist (1996). 
13 For an overview see Freixas/Rochet (1997). Most recent contributions include Rajan (1996) and Kashyap/ 
Rajan/Stein (1999). The quotation paraphrases the title of an influential article by James (1987).  
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those effects which have traditionally been assumed to exist and to underlie the transmission 
of monetary policy into the real economy. But both for practical monetary policy and for the 
problem which is discussed in this paper, namely that of possible consequences of differences 
between national financial systems, it is important to know more than merely that monetary 
policy has an effect. One needs to know why it matters and how it affects the real economy in 
order to be able to assess how strong its effects are in order to be able to determine the direc-
tion and the strength of policy measures.
14  
The credit channel view suggests a list of items which can be used to check which elements of 
a financial system might be particularly relevant when one tries to analyse the implications of 
differences in financial systems between countries for monetary policy. This list would be too 
comprehensive to develop it here, and thus I will restrict myself to indicating classes of 
factors.  
The central bank and the money market structure are the first category. Some of the key ques-
tions here are: How is monetary policy implemented? Who interacts directly with the central 
bank? How deep and liquid are the markets for short-term securities like CDs, commercial 
paper and government bills? What scope for administrative interference in the short-term 
operations of banks do the government and the central bank have?  
At the level of the banking sector, some of the relevant issues are: What are the most preva-
lent types of banks? What is the typical relationship between banks and firms? What are the 
legal forms and ownership patterns of banks? What is the level of concentration and competi-
tion in the banking sector? What is the nature of the relationship between banks and non-bank 
financial intermediaries; are the NBFIs competitors or subsidiaries of banks? What is the asset 
and liability structure of the banks' balance sheets?  
Non-bank financial intermediaries and capital markets constitute the main alternatives to 
banks. They need to be looked at if we wish to determine the extent to which firms and banks 
are able to circumvent the effects of a restrictive monetary policy which would be transmitted 
through the bank lending channel. As far as non-bank financial intermediaries are concerned, 
some of the most important factors are (a) the nature of their relationship to the central bank 
                                                 
14 So far, and according to my knowledge, the credit channel is the subject of only a few empirical investigations 
in Germany. Stöß (1996) and Guender/Moersch (1997) come to a negative conclusion concerning the importance 
of the bank lending channel in Germany. Worms (1997) finds some positive evidence with respect to the balance 
sheet channel. Küppers (1998a, 1998b) forcefully criticises the results of Guender/Moersch and Stöß and finds 
strong support for a credit channel in his own empirical study. For the United Kingdom Dale/Haldane (1995) and 
Ganley/Salmon (1997) show some importance of the credit channel. Recent reseach on the credit channel in 
France includes Goux (1996), Candelon/Cudeville (1996) and Payelle (1996). Their results are somewhat 
ambiguous, but support the assumption that the credit channel is relevant in France too.  
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and to the banks, (b) how important they are in the financial sector, and (c) their asset and 
liability structures. As far as capital markets are concerned it is important to know which 
markets exist, who has access to them, how deep and how liquid they are.  
Finally it would be important to look in detail at the sector of the non-financial firms and at 
the household sector to assess how the actors in these sectors are affected by monetary policy 
measures of the central bank. Key questions here would be: How are they typically financed? 
What is the prevailing mode of holding liquidity? How many of them have access to security 
markets or to foreign sources of funding? And last but not least, how are they governed and 
what is the time horizon of their strategies?  
If the goal is to conduct a reasonably comprehensive comparison of financial systems to 
assess the consequences of national differences for a common monetary policy, then the view 
one adopts concerning the transmission mechanism of monetary policy evidently has a strong 
influence on the specific choice of aspects which must be examined. The credit channel 
implies a much longer list of factors than the traditional channels. The characteristics of some 
of these items in the financial systems of France, Germany and United Kingdom will be 
described in section 4.2 and the appendix. However, even more important than the individual 
items in this list – which is not even intended to be complete - is the question how they are 
related to each other. This is a topic to which I will return in the next section. In my opinion, 
the credit channel view is extremely helpful for an analysis of the consequences which differ-
ences in entire financial systems have for the topic under discussion here – an assertion whose 
validity I will seek to demonstrate in the following section and in the final section of the 
paper.   
 
3.   How different are financial systems in Europe?   
3.1.   How different can financial systems be?               
To start this section, I want to recall the definition of the financial system provided in the 
introduction. The financial system includes the financial sector as the provider of financial 
services as well as the real sectors of the economy in so far as they demand or, as the case my 
be, fail to demand, these services, and the complex relationships between the financial and the 
non-financial sectors. Evidently, it does not only depend on the financial sector but also on the 
real sectors and the relationships between them, how monetary policy affects the real econ-
omy. Thus, the broad definition is appropriate for any analysis of monetary policy.   
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This definition is also important for another reason. It helps to get a more comprehensive 
picture of the extent to which the financial systems of countries differ, and the respects in 
which they differ, than could be obtained using the narrow concept of the financial sector. 
Indeed, as I will argue in this section, both financial sectors and financial systems differ 
between countries, but the latter are more dissimilar than the former, and differences in other 
parts of the financial systems – i.e. in parts other than the financial sectors could be highly 
relevant for the design and conduct of a common monetary policy. Thus the broad definition 
of the financial system is particularly appropriate for studying the problems of a common 
monetary policy in different countries, as it points to the fact that those aspects of the real 
economy which are important for the working of the transmission mechanism and differ 
between countries may correspond in a systematic or non-accidental way to the differences 
between the financial sectors.  This correspondence is crucial for the effects of a common 
monetary policy.  
If I make this claim, I am obliged to take a closer – which is at the same time also a more 
abstract - look at the concept of a financial system.
15 The broadly defined financial systems is 
an open system; there is no clear factual criterion to determine what belongs to it and what 
does not. Rather, the boundaries of the system at large are drawn by the observer who, in a 
given case, seeks to addresses a certain problem in the most fruitful way. For the purpose of 
this paper, one can distinguish four closely interrelated 
subsystems which are, in turn, composed of several ele-
ments. Figure 1 shows these subsystems, which are at the 
same time elements of the larger system, the financial 
system. They include, first of all, the financial sector. The 
second subsystem consists of the surplus and the deficit 
units in so far as they provide funds to the financial sector 
or obtain funds from it, and thus of the savings behaviour 
of households and of the financing of business or corpora-
tions and governmental bodies, and of the financial 
instruments used by the parties to financial contracts. It is advisable to include corporate 
governance as the third subsystem and corporate strategies and structures – for short: the 
business system – as the fourth one. Note that there is no need to define these subsystems in 
such a way that they do not overlap. 
                                                 
15 The following discussion is based on Hackethal/Schmidt (1999b). See also Milgrom /Roberts (1995), 
Hackethal/Tyrell (1998) and Aoki (1999). 
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It is imperative to see how these subsystems are composed and function individually, and how 
they are related to each other. As the colloquial use of the term "system" suggests, a system is 
more than a collection of elements. For a system to be "really a system", its elements must "fit 
together". In economic life, one can assume that it has positive consequences if this is the 
case, and negative consequences if the elements do not fit. One can speak of "important" 
differences between financial systems, if not only the main elements of which they are com-
posed, but also the way in which they are related, are different.   
The interesting thing about the subsystems and their interrelationship, and thus he interesting 
thing about the entire financial system is that they are composed of complementary elements. 
Elements of a system are called complementary (to each other) if they mutually increase the 
"benefit" they yield in terms of whatever the objective function or the standard for evaluating 
the system may be, and mutually reduce their disadvantages or "costs".
16 A system is called 
consistent if its complementary elements indeed take on the values which make the system 
attain a local optimum. Systems of complementary elements typically have more than one 
optimum, and the local optima are clearly distinct configurations of the values of the 
elements.  
Financial systems are systems in this specific sense. The complementarity of their elements 
and the economic benefits which a consistent financial system can be assumed to produce are 
the factors which account for the tendency of countries' financial sectors and non-financial 
sectors to co-vary in a systematic way. To illustrate the concepts of complementarity and con-
sistency in the case of financial systems and also to lay the foundation for the next argument, I 
would now like to take a look at common two-way classifications from the literature for the 
four subsystems shown in Figure 1. 
(1) For the subsystem "financial sector" it is common to distinguish between a bank-domi-
nated and a capital market-dominated variant based on certain measures of the size and 
"importance" of banks and capital markets, respectively. 
(2) The second subsystem refers to how savers hold their financial wealth and the sources 
from which corporations obtain the bulk of the funding for their investments. This 
suggests a similar two-way classification distinguishing a bank- and a capital market-
oriented system.
17  
                                                 
16 For this definition see also Milgrom/Roberts (1995). The mathematics behind the concept of complementarity 
are surveyed by Topkis (1998). 
17 See Rybczinski (1984) and Berglöf (1990) for this classification with respect to the first and second 
subsystem.  
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(3) With respect to the third subsystem, corporate governance, there are two-way classifica-
tions according to different criteria depending on whether the safeguarding of the interests 
of owners, of creditors, or of the staff  is involved. The details need not interest us here.
 18 
Suffice it to say that these classifications can be brought together under the heading of 
"insider-" and "outsider-controlled" corporate governance systems.
19  
(4) Lastly, firms can be classified according to their business systems into two groups: those 
which make ample use of firm-specific human capital, rely to a large extent on long-term 
and trust-based relationships – or implicit contracts - with their various "stakeholders" and 
partners, and are more suited to undertake strategic adjustments through longer sequences 
of small changes, and those with the opposite characteristics.
20  
Looked at individually, each of these eight specific subsystems can be interpreted as 
consistent systems of complementary elements. Due to space limitations, I cannot 
demonstrate this here. Instead, I will concentrate on the question of how the four sets of 
subsystems are related to each other: The subsystems are themselves complementary elements 
of the overall system; and only two specific combinations constitute consistent systems. As 
far as the first two elements are concerned, this seems plausible. Even though there may be an 
empirical problem in demonstrating this correspondence, which I shall discuss below, one 
would tend to think that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the two classifications 
in these two subsystems: A system in which savers entrust a large fraction of their wealth to 
banks or closely bank-related non-bank financial intermediaries should also be one in which 
the banks are the dominant element in the financial sector; and capital market dominance 
should equally be reflected in the patterns of saving and financing and the size and role of the 
capital market as an institution.  
Moreover, a bank-dominated financial sector and a bank-oriented system of savings and 
financing also "fit", or correspond in functional terms, to an insider-controlled governance 
system and a business system with much firm-specific human capital, many implicit contracts 
and a tendency towards gradual change.
21 The set of other "values" for the four subsystems as 
elements also constitute a consistent financial system. It is characterised by a greater impor-
tance for capital markets than for banks in the financial sector, more saving and financing via 
                                                 
18 These dichotomies and the way in which they are related, are discussed in Hackethal/Schmidt (1999b). 
19 See Franks/Mayer (1994), Schmidt (1997b) and Tirole (1999). 
20 See Boot/Macey (1998), Hackethal/Schmidt (1999b) and Aoki (1999). 
21 The link between bank-oriented financing, insider-controlled governance and firm-specific human capital is 
more deeply analysed in Hackethal/Tyrell (1998) and Berkovitch/Israel (1998). The correspondence to the 
business systems is discussed by Milgrom/Roberts (1995), Aoki (1999) and Hackethal/Schmidt (1999b). See 
also Mayer (1998).   
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the capital-market than with, and from, banks, outsider-controlled corporate governance and 
highly flexible corporations which are able to undertake strategic adjustments with "big 
leaps". Evidently, these two systems are clearly distinguishable types of financial systems or, 
to use Williamson's suggestive term, "discrete alternatives".
22 
So at least in theory, financial systems can be fundamentally different. And since the four 
subsystems influence each other in their functional values, entire financial systems can be 
"more different", i.e. different in a more fundamental way, than financial sectors alone might.   
 
3.2.  How different are those in Europe really?              
The fact that one can distinguish two types of – consistent - financial systems at a conceptual 
level does not imply that one could also find these different types in reality, nor does it imply 
that real financial systems do in fact correspond to this typology. Therefore, the questions of 
whether real financial systems have complementary elements, and thus whether they are 
"really systems" - and if they are, whether they are also consistent systems – are empirical 
questions. It should also be noted that the theoretical distinction does not tell us whether the 
financial systems of the major European economies are different. Thus, we shall now turn to 
the empirical issues. It goes without saying that – not only due to the limited space avaliable - 
only a very brief discussion of this complicated subject can be provided here; however, I hope 
that by drawing attention to a few key aspects I will be able to make my point. It is equally 
clear that one cannot expect to find a perfect correspondence between a given type of finan-
cial system and a given real financial system, i.e. that of a specific country.  
Nevertheless, the classification of financial systems suggests differences in reality.
23 The 
example which immediately come to mind are the German and the British financial systems – 
and this is the main reason why I anticipate a likely future course of events and assume that 
the United Kingdom is already part of "Euroland".  
The German financial system is of the first type. The German banking sector is big and some 
banks are important and powerful, whereas capital markets and capital market-oriented insti-
tutions such as pension funds are "underdeveloped", as can be measured by indicators such as 
the total assets of banks and stock market capitalisation as percentages of GDP, respectively.
24 
Corporate governance in Germany functions mainly through internal mechanisms and 
involves "insiders" to the corporations or, in other words, people and institutions which have 
                                                 
22 See Williamson (1988). 
23 See also Goodhart (1993).  
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long-term interests in safeguarding their specific relationships with a corporation and that are 
typically better informed about its prospects and problems than anonymous market partici-
pants could be.
25 There does not seem to be an active market for take-overs. The role of 
banks, of other corporations and of employees having codetermination rights in the govern-
ance of corporations epitomise this system, and despite the widely publicised declarations to 
the contrary, the maximisation of the shareholder value is not the dominant objective of most 
large German firms. Even though this may be more speculative, one can also add the obser-
vation that at least on an economy-wide level German firms are more woven into nets of 
implicit contracts, that labour turnover is lower and that the corporations are less able and 
willing to undertake abrupt adjustments to changing circumstances than British corporations. 
Thus it is fair to say that at least as regards the first, the third and, to a certain degree, the 
fourth element (or subsystem), the German financial system is consistent.  
Without doing too much violence to a reality which is of course much more complex, one can 
characterise the British financial system as one in which core elements - or subsystems - (1) 
and (3), and possibly also (4),
26 take on values which are precisely the opposite of those 
determined for Germany. In the United Kingdom, the relative importance of banks in the 
financial sector is not as great; capital markets and institutions, notably pension funds which 
are capital market-oriented and in most cases independent of the banks, play an important 
role; there is no formal and no de facto codetermination; and financial intermediaries are 
scarcely involved in the governance of corporations.
27 The corporate objective is unrestricted 
maximisation of profits or shareholder value, and given the nature of the UK financial system 
there is also no reason why this should be otherwise. The basic mechanism of corporate gov-
ernance is the take-over market, and the entire corporate governance system is clearly an out-
sider control system.
28 Overall, the British financial system relies very much on market 
mechanisms and less on institutions in the conventional meaning of the term, i.e. it relies less 
on groups of people who interact directly with each other over a long period and not only 
have a certain degree of mutual commitment but also find that their interaction gives rise to 
intense conflicts over important issues which are, however, resolved internally and ultimately 
in a peaceful way.
29  
                                                                                                                                                         
24 See the empirical results in ECB (1999) and Davis (1998). Some indicators are presented in the annex.  
25 See Schmidt/Tyrell (1997) and Prigge (1998). 
26 For the UK we do not know enough about (4), but see Hackethal/Schmidt (1999b) for first results and some 
rather speculative conclusions. 
27See Goergen/Renneboog (1998) and Franks/Mayer/Renneboog (1998). 
28 See Charkham (1994) Franks/Mayer (1996) and Wymeersch (1998). 
29 For a similar characterisation of the British system, see also Prevezer/Ricketts (1994).  
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Despite far reaching changes in the regulatory and competitive environment in which finan-
cial sectors and non-financial corporations in Germany and the United Kingdom operate, it is 
fair to say that the characteristic features of these two financial systems, as far as I have 
characterised them up to now, are surprisingly stable. Many details of the financial systems 
have been modified, but their fundamental or structural features have not changed over the 
last 20 years, and, indeed, they have probably remained essentially unaltered for much longer 
than that.  
In the case of the French financial system, it is more difficult to find a unifying "logique". At 
least the efforts in this area which I have undertaken with colleagues and students – for some 
time now, we have been trying to locate the French financial system along the spectrum of 
market and institution-based (or Anglo-Saxon and German-type) systems – have not been 
successful.
30 This is so for at least two reasons. One is the strong role which the French state 
(or government) has played in the financial system over the years. It is extremely difficult to 
integrate the extent and the forms of state or government intervention into the two-way classi-
fication which was described in the last subsection, or to invent a different classification 
incorporating the additional dimension of state activity.
31 The second reason is that the French 
financial system and its four subsystems have experienced dramatic and fundamental changes 
during the last two decades. If one looks at individual elements, it appears that these changes 
have already converted the French financial system from the being of the German type - 
except for the pervasive state intervention - to one of the Anglo-Saxon type.
32 This may 
indeed be the case. But in the past the French financial system had a number of elements 
which were certainly not congruent with the German model or the German financial sector 
type, and today it includes several elements which do not "fit" the general structure of the 
Anglo-Saxon model or financial sector type. 
Referring not only to European financial systems, but also to those of Japan and the U.S., 
Figure 2 summarises the characteristic features of consistent financial systems. The tables in 
the annex provide empirical support for my brief summary description of the three financial 
systems. Nevertheless, it would be good to have more empirical evidence to underscore the 
profound differences between Germany and the United Kingdom and to support my view that 
the system in France does not conform to either of the two "polar" models and is at present 
                                                 
30 See Schmidt (1997) for some details. A recent book by Plihon (1998) pp.79, is among the numerous 
supporting French references which one could quote here.  
31 For a similar conclusion see OECD (1995).  
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unstable in so far as it is undergoing a process of rapid change. In particular, additional 
evidence is called for in one respect: In my account of the financial systems, I have 
intentionally left out the second subsystem of financial patterns. It is logical to ask why, and 
of course the obvious answer 
is that might not accord with 
the general pictures of the 
systems. And while the 
savings part does not offer 
any problem in this respect, 
the financing part does. At 
least this appears to be the 
case if one accepts at face 
value the results of an 
important strand in the 
academic research about how 
firm investment is financed. 
The findings presented in this 
literature are plainly 
inconsistent with the view underlying my argument which is inspired by the theory-based 
assumption that there should also be differences in the financing patterns of the firms in the 
different countries and that these should correspond to the differences between, both, the 
respective financial sectors and corporate governance systems. This inconsistency has to be 
clarified if my claim that there are in fact fundamental differences is to be regarded as valid.  
In a series of highly influential papers, Colin Mayer and his adherents
33 have arrived at the 
opposite conclusion. First of all, they take the position that there are hardly any systematic 
differences between national patterns of corporate financing, and secondly that those 
differences which do exist, are inconsistent with what one would expect on the basis of theory 
and of the empirical features of the subsystems (1) and (3) in the various countries. For 
instance, Mayer (1988, 1990) found in his early studies that bank financing is more important 
in the United Kingdom than in Germany and that equity financing is even negative in the 
United Kingdom. Corbett/ Jenkinson (1996, 1997) supported these results in more recent and 
                                                                                                                                                         
32 For instance, this can be concluded from the in recent years mere active market for corporate control 
(Wymeersch, 1998). On the other hand, ownership concentration and voting power in French public corporations 
indicates an insider–control system (Bloch/Kremp (1998). 
Figure 2: Consistent Financial Systems 
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much more extensive studies. These findings do indeed pose a puzzle. If they were true, they 
would break the logical chain connecting the four subsystems and contradict the proposition 
that the German and the British financial systems are consistent. Moreover, they would 
invalidate the whole concept of financial systems as consistent sets of complementary 
elements.  
From the perspective adopted in the present paper, it is fortunate that the methodology 
developed by Mayer and used by him and others has a flaw. Because of this flaw, their 
findings are simply misleading on an empirical level. Mayer and his followers look at net 
flows of funds between economic sectors whereas they should have looked at gross flows, 
because in the process of aggregating over real and financial investments and over time, 
netting eliminates the relevant differences which might exist, and thus the role of external 
debt financing disappears almost completely. In his dissertation, Andreas Hackethal (1999) 
has identified this flaw, suggested a way to avoid it and recalculated the financing structures 
of firms in Germany, Japan and the United States. As the first columns per country (with the 
heading "gross") in Table 1 show, his correction yields patterns of long term financing which 
are consistent with expectations based on the structure of the entire financial systems. The 
second columns ("net") and the first line concerning internal funds, for which the net and 
gross figures are identical, show the corresponding net figures derived by Corbett/Jenkinson 
(1997) for comparison.
34  
                                                                                                                                                         
33 See Mayer (1988, 1990) and Corbett/Jenkinson(1996, 1997) for international comparisons of financing 
patterns and Edwards/Fischer (1994) for a study of Germany and Bertero (1994) for France . 
34 In the work of Mayer and his followers, one can find another distinction. It is the distingction between net and 
gross figures, which concerns a different aspect from the one under discussion here. Their "gross figure" are 
calculated after the aggregation which is identified in Hackethal (1999) and Hackethal/Schmidt (1999a) as the 
cause of the bias.    
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Table 1: Financing patterns in various countries 
  Germany  Japan  USA  UK 
Sources of Finance  gross  net  Gross  net  gross  Net  net 
    % of physical investment (gross: 1970-1996; net: 1970-1994)   
Internal funds  78,9  69,9  96,1  93,3 
Bank finance  72,9  11,9  152,3  26,7  65,3  11,1  14,6 
NBFI finance  9,3  n.a.  0,0  n.a.  24,6  n.a.  n.a. 
Bonds  7,0  -1,0  14,3  4,0  48,5  15,4  4,2 
Commercial paper  0,0  n.a.  5,7  n.a.  9,2  n.a.  n.a. 
New equity  3,8  0,1  3,8  3,5  14,9  -7,6  -4,6 
Trade credit, others and 
statistical adjustment 
n.a.  10,1  n.a.  -4,1  n.a.  -15,0  -7,5 
Note: Net figures and the those for “Internal Funds” are taken from Corbett/Jenkinson (1997). They add up to 100%. 
These authors include both “NBFI Finance” and “Commercial Paper” in “Bank Finance”(except for the U.S., where 
“Commercial Paper” is included in “Others”. Gross figures, which by construction do not add up to 100%, are taken from 
Hackethal (1999). Only long-term external funds are shown. 
The data needed to recalculate the figures for French and British firms, and thus provide a 
more accurate picture of their financing patterns, are not yet available, but it seems plausible 
that, given the similarity of the financial systems of the US and the United Kingdom, those for 
the United Kingdom will not differ too much from those for the US. If this is indeed the case, 
the claim that the British and the German financial systems are consistent and differ in a 
fundamental way can be upheld.  
In another empirical study we have found further interesting evidence to support the 
assumption of fundamental differences between the British and the German financing systems 
and the proposition that dramatic changes are under way in France.
35 In this paper, we have 
calculated various intersectoral intermediation and securitization ratios for the three countries 
over a span of fifteen years. In contrast to the "conventional wisdom" to the effect that there is 
a general tendency towards disintermediation and securitisation and that, overall, the financial 
systems in Europe are becoming more similar, our study shows that the levels of 
disintermediation and securitisation differ substantially between countries and that, except for 
France, they are surprisingly stable over time. As Figure 3 shows, the "liability intermediation 
ratios of non-financial companies", which measures the fraction of external financing which 
comes from intermediaries, (Fig. 3a) and the "intermediation ratios of non-financial 
companies to banks", which measure the share of bank financing in the total external 
financing of firms (Fig. 3b) and the ratios of securitisation of corporate financing (Fig. 3c)  
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differ greatly between Germany and Great Britain, and are almost completely stable in these 
two countries. For France, these ratios exhibit not only a great instability, but also a tendency 
to move away from the German to the British model.  
 
Figure 3: Intermediation and Securitisation Ratios 
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This may suffice to demonstrate that the general characterisations of the three financial 
systems are empirically valid, that the overall financial systems of Germany and the United 
Kingdom are consistent configurations of the subsystems as complementary elements and that 
there are indeed considerable and, at least in some cases, persistent differences between the 
financial systems of the major European countries. Having established this, I can now analyse 
what consequences this might have for a common monetary policy within EMU. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
35 See Schmidt/Hackethal/Tyrell (1999).  
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4.  Consequences for EMU: Financial systems' structures and common monetary policy 
4.1. Is there a common reaction of the different national systems to monetary policy? 
After having argued that the credit channel is probably relevant in Europe too, and that 
financial systems in Europe differ in fundamental ways, I will now offer a theoretically 
inspired speculation as to what main consequence for a common monetary policy these 
differences entail. One could be inclined to think that marked differences make it very 
difficult to design and to implement a common monetary policy. Is this conclusion justified or 
would adopting this position – which would of course also have significant political 
implications – mean simply to jump to conclusions?  
The transmission of monetary policy goes from the central bank (CB) to the (other parts of 
the) financial sector (FSc)  and from there to the real economy (RE), which reacts to monetary 
developments by changing investment and possibly consumption decisions, which in turn 
determines aggregate income, employment and the price level. The top line in Figure 4 below 
shows the elements of the transmission mechanism. A denotes the relationship between CB 
and Fsec, while B denotes the relationship between FSec and RE.  
Since I wish to focus on different financial systems in a monetary union, differences between 
countries at the level of CB are of no concern for my mental experiment; as I assume that 
there is just one single CB. But financial systems may vary in four respects: (1) The FSec's  
may be, and indeed are, dissimilar; (2) the way in which the financial sector (FSec) is 
influenced by central bank policy measures (A) can, and probably does, differ; and (3) 
important aspects of RE, notably company financing, governance and strategies and structures 
are likely to differ, and (4) the ways in which the financial sector changes credit supply to 
firms and households, and in which the real sectors change their demand for financial 
services, in reactions to the changing conditions in the financial sector (B) seem to be 
different. Or to put it more succinctly: financial and real sectors and the sensitivities of the 
financial sector to central bank policies, and of the real sectors to changing conditions in the 
financial sector may differ between countries.   
Comparing Germany and the United Kingdom, one can ask: In which system does a central 
bank impulse of a given kind and size have a stronger effect on the financial sector (A)? And 
in which of the two countries does a given amount of influence of the central bank on the 
financial sector have a stronger effect on the aggregate demand of the real sectors (B) - and 
ultimately on income, employment and prices?  
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The answers depend on how one sees these relationships and on the structures of the financial 
systems and in particular on the roles of the banking sector in the respective financial system. 
I use the concepts underlying the notion of a credit channel. Here the immediate effect of 
central bank action is assumed to be mainly an effect on the banks. Thus, the strength of the 
relation A between the central bank and the financial sector is likely to be stronger in a 
country in which the relative importance of banks in the financial sector is greater. This is the 
case in Germany. I therefore hypothesise that the financial sector of Germany reacts more 
strongly to monetary policy impulses than the British financial sector.  
As a second step, one has to ask how changing conditions in the entire financial system and in 
particular in the banking sector affect decisions of firms and households. To provide a 
concrete example, let us examine the case of a tightening of monetary policy.
36 Would 
funding opportunities and funding costs for the real sectors be restricted or raised more in 
Germany or in the United Kingdom? I presume that the restrictive effect of a given influence 
of the central bank on the financial sector and in particular on the situation of the banks would 
be less in Germany than in the United Kingdom, and this for three reasons. 
The first reason is that the relationship between banks on the one side and firms and 
households on the other is closer in Germany than in the United Kingdom. Due to their closer 
multi-faceted and more long-term oriented relationships with their customers, German banks 
might be more hesitant to tighten credit terms for their clients in order not to burden them too 
much and not to disturb their longer-term investment and business strategies in which a 
"housebank"
37 has a lively interest . In a system like that of the United Kingdom, in which 
arm's length banking prevails, banks and other financial intermediaries simply have less 
reason to refrain from passing on restrictive monetary policy impulses to their customers; they 
are less committed to their long-term strategies.
38 An additional argument is that, compared 
                                                 
36 This is more than a way of making the discussion more concrete. It might well be that the arguments which 
follow, only apply to the special case of a restrictive monetary policy.  
37 This reflects that there is some truth to the belief that the old system of "housebanks" still prevails. This has 
been vigorously challenged in a well-known book by Edwards and Fischer (1994). But note that the empirical 
basis of their attack on this presumed myth is an empirical analysis of financing patterns using the methodology 
of Colin Mayer (1988), which was discussed as yielding unreliable empirical results in section 3.2 above. Recent 
studies by Elsas/Krahnen (1998) and Harhoff/Körting (1998) indicate that banks which perceive themselves as 
the "housebank" of a given customer firm, and which are also perceived as such by the customer firm itself, 
behave systematically differently, that is in a more co-operative and more long-term oriented manner. Thus 
relationship banking and housebanks still seems to be real factors.  
38 Furthermore, a recent study of the monetary transmission mechanism in Germany with segregated bank 
balance-sheet variables by Küppers (1998a) demonstrates the relevance of the “housebank-relationship". His 
results show that, in contrast to empirical findings for the US by Kashyap/Stein (1997b), credit terms and loan 
volumes of smaller German banks, namely the Savings Banks and the Co-operative Banks, react to a monetary 
tightening to a much smaller extend than the German "Grossbanken". In doing so, they isolate their customers  
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with a typical British bank, the typical German bank would have more information on its 
customers, and would thus need to worry less about their net values declining as a 
consequence of higher interest rates.
39 
The second reason is that credit terms differ systematically between countries, and that these 
differences are in line with the general characteristics of the respective financial systems. In 
Germany, credit contracts have a longer maturity on average, and interest rates are typically 
less adjustable than in the United Kingdom. Thus, the financial sector would simply find it 
more difficult to pass on rising interest rates. Furthermore, German accounting principles 
allow firms to build up hidden reserves to a much greater extent. As a consequence, the 
investment decisions of German firms should be less sensitive to short-run changes in the 
costs and availability of external funds. By contrast, UK accounting principles are such that 
fluctuations in the cash flow have a greater influence on investment, which in turn amplifies 
the effects of larger fluctuations in the cash-flow on aggregate demand and income. 
The third reason why non-financial companies in Germany do not react as sensitively when 
the banks and the rest of the financial sector find themselves in a more restrictive situation is 
to be found in the prevailing governance and ownership patterns in both the financial and the 
non-financial sectors. The standard models in the macroeconomic literature about the 
reactions of banks to a restrictive monetary policy of the central bank and about the reactions 
of firms' investment decisions to a tightening of credit terms are almost always based on the 
assumption that all economic agents are strictly profit-oriented and have a rather short-term 
perspective. This assumption is not equally valid for German banks and corporations on the 
one side and UK banks and corporations on the other side. The bulk of the institutions 
comprising the German banking system are not privately owned, profit-oriented joint stock 
corporations or limited liability companies. And even those big banks in Germany which are 
joint stock corporations have a governance system which shields their management almost 
perfectly from the performance pressure of their shareholders, and thus their behaviour may 
not be too different from that of a "Sparkasse" or a "Volksbank". Thus the assumption that as 
a general rule, banks will react to central bank impulses in accordance with standard models, 
may be wrong, at least for certain financial systems. In Germany, for instance, they have a 
long-term interest in maintaining stable and "healthy" relations with "healthy" clients, and it 
seems plausible to assume that they pursue this interest by dampening monetary shocks, 
                                                                                                                                                         
from monetary shocks. Küppers argues that Savings Banks and Co-operative Banks are those credit institutions 
in Germany which conform most to the model of a housebank with respect to a large number of their customers.  
39 That this more efficient way of gathering and processing information by banks can also result in more efficient 
investment decisions by firms, is theoretically shown in Dewatripont/Maskin (1995) and von Thadden (1995).   
 
23
irrespective of whether these are intended by the central bank or not. At the level of large 
companies, a strict and exclusive short-term profit-orientation
40 is also the exception and not 
the rule in Germany. The more moderate profit orientation of many large corporations tends 
to make them "ignore" changing financial conditions so as to promote their long-term 
strategies, and they probably are more prone to do this than their counterparts in the United 
Kingdom. Here I would like to reiterate that this behavioural pattern on the part of German 
banks and the large firms is not necessarily a "problem" or a "flaw"; rather, it is a feature that 
is consistent with the general logic of the German financial system.
 41  
In the United Kingdom, both banks and corporations are more forced to strive for profit and in 
so doing react to changing price signals. Both in their relationships with clients and in the way 
they value outstanding securities, privately owned and unambiguously profit-oriented banks 
and other financial intermediaries react more strongly to central bank activity; and private 
firms which have to be extremely conscious of their stock price performance are more 
strongly motivated, indeed forced, to react more to price signals, as it is to be expected in a 
more market-oriented system. 
Thus one can conclude that the two systems also have different reaction functions with 
respect to the relationship between the financial sector and the non-financial sectors (B). The 
British system reacts more, and 
the German system reacts less, to 
changes in the situation of the 
respective financial sectors. 
Figure 4 summarises the two 
parts of the argument presented 
so far. As can be seen, the 
German system combines a 
stronger influence of the central 
bank on the situation of the 
financial sector (A, with  4 stars in the second line of Figure 4) and a weaker influence of the 
financial sector on the real economy (B, with 2 stars). The situation in the United Kingdom is 
                                                 
40 A genuine profit-orientation is typically an orientation towards short-term profits because otherwise it would 
be difficult to make this orientation operational. Long-term profit orientation would be indistinguishable from an 
orientation towards the maximisation of total value or growth potential or "strategic advantage"; see Schmidt/ 
Massmann 1999.  
41 This argument reflects the effect of inter-generational risk smoothing through the financial system which is 
discussed on a theoretical level by Allen/Gale (1997). These authors show that the limited - or merely long-term 
- profit orientation of the banking sector can lead to welfare gains.  
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the reverse. The dominance of the central bank over the financial system is weaker (A, with 2 
stars in the third line) and that of the financial sector over the real sector is stronger (B with 4 
stars).  
It would, of course, be naive to quantify the strength of these effects solely on the basis of the 
arguments which I have provided. Accordingly, all that I would like to do here is to present 
the idea that the relative strengths of the two relationships A and B are inversely related. That 
this should be so, is not by coincidence. Instead, it follows from the systemic features of the – 
broadly defined – financial systems, which are consistent in each of these two countries.   
If one carried the exercise of "counting stars" to an extreme, one would find that the net effect 
of monetary policy may be the same in both countries under consideration here. But I do not 
mean to imply that the two differences between the partial channels A and B in the two 
countries cancel out completely. I chose to use stars, and not numbers, because the latter 
might have suggested a greater degree of precision, perhaps leading to misunderstandings.  
However, it does seem safe to assume that the differences between the stylised financial 
systems have offsetting effects with respect to A and B, and in itself this may be an important 
factor for assessing the potential for a common monetary policy in an enlarged "Euroland". 
The two financial systems may differ in a fundamental way, and yet the net effectiveness of 
monetary policy may not be all that different. If this is news, it is good news for the 
proponents of a monetary union in Europe and its future enlargement.  
The argument presented here in a very non-technical manner here, implicitly draws on the 
credit channel literature. It could be rendered more precise and more technical by making this 
basis explicit and spelling out in some detail how the differences between the financial 
systems determine the strength of the relationships A and B in the two countries. Not 
unexpectedly, this exercise would demonstrate that the effects of institutional features on the 
transmission mechanism are complex, difficult to aggregate and in some cases ambiguous. 
Nevertheless, the basic thrust of the argument would not change; the overall effects of the 
working of the bank-lending and the balance sheet channels are in line with my intuitive 
argument.
42 But even a more technical approach would not solve one important aggregation 
problem: How can one "add" the different effects of the links A and B given that the 
relevance of the link B depends on how strong the link A is? It seems that this question 
requires much more work and in-depth econometric studies. I would be delighted if the brief 
                                                 
42 I am extremely grateful to Marcel Tyrell and Falko Fecht for having helped me to arrive at this result, which is 
not elaborated in the present paper because of space limitations.  
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non-technical discussion I have presented here were to be the inspiration for such a research 
project.  
Having admitted that my attribution of stars to the partial channels A and B in the two stylised 
financial systems owes a lot to the credit channel literature, I should briefly add a conjecture 
concerning whether the result is stable with respect to the theoretical basis. As the general 
thrust of the credit channel argument is that the possible effects of monetary shocks, including 
those engineered by a central bank, are probably greater than those which the literature based 
on the interest rate channel takes into account. If one retains the notion of the financial system 
as a system of complementary elements, and the premise that Germany and the United 
Kingdom have consistent but differing financial systems, and combines them with the 
assumptions of the interest rate channel, than the effects for both partial channels would be 
weaker: The effect of the central bank on the banking system (A), which could be 
approximated by the multiplier, would be less pronounced in both countries and the difference 
between the effect in Germany and the effect in the UK would still be about the same. The 
effect of a change in the situation of the banks and other financial institutions on the real 
economy (B) would probably also be weaker in general, and at least some of the arguments 
which would suggest that in the United Kingdom this effect is stronger, would also still apply. 
Thus, the main result, namely that the two parts A and B of the transmission mechanisms tend 
to exhibit offsetting differences between the two countries, would also be valid if one 
disregarded the specific aspects of the credit channel. This is shown by the stars in brackets on 
the lower lines in Figure4.  
I take it to be a good sign that the validity of my main result does not depend on the 
theoretical basis which I have used and for which the empirical basis is still weak as far as 
Europe is concerned. However, this - very limited - support of its validity comes at a price: 
leaving out all of those aspects which are specific to the credit channel creates an 
inconsistency between the ways in which financial systems on the one hand, and transmission 
mechanisms on the other, are seen. And as inconsistency is a likely source of error, it should 
also be avoided when one is presenting an intuitive and non-technical argument.  
 
4.2. Are the different reaction functions likely to be stable?         
I would like to conclude the paper with some brief remarks about dynamic issues. Financial 
systems and their subsystems are not immutable. European integration, regulatory 
convergence and, last but not least, the common currency, have already brought important  
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changes, and are likely to lead to more change in the future. What does this imply for the 
argument presented in the preceding section?  
I do not believe that the introduction of the euro and even the enlargement to include the UK 
will change the basic structures of the financial systems of the participating countries in any 
fundamental way. Money and central banks are not core elements of the concept of a financial 
systems on which the main proposition in this paper is based. Different countries can have 
different financial systems in the sense of consistent sets of complementary elements and 
subsystems even though they have a common currency and thus necessarily an almost 
identical monetary policy. This suggests that the introduction of the euro per se will also not 
invalidate my proposition that some financial systems in Europe are fundamentally different 
and that a common monetary policy may nevertheless be feasible.  
The common currency and especially the enlargement to include the United Kingdom will, 
however, magnify all of the forces which are currently working to transform the financial 
systems, and speed up ongoing processes of change. This raises the question of how financial 
systems change in general and what this implies for the common monetary policy in 
"Euroland". Due to space reasons, I will have to restrict myself to a few brief remarks.  
The "fact" that financial systems have the property that every element of a financial system is 
functionally related to many others and that a consistent financial system constitutes a local 
optimum is relevant here. It implies that partial reforms are not likely to be sustainable, and 
this in turn implies that financial systems are not likely to change and to converge gradually. 
But if there is no gradual convergence, what else could happen? If, for instance, political 
forces or dynamic entrepreneurs in the financial service industry succeed in introducing 
elements of one system – for instance the active take-over market of the British system - into 
the another system - for example that of Germany - the immediate result would be an 
inconsistent "non-system". If this happens, there will be pressure to restore consistency. A 
"restauration" of the old system is one way of achieving consistency. In this case the 
"innovation" is rejected. This is one possible course of events.  
The other possibility is that the forces which make changes appear desirable are strong and 
the forces of "restauration" weak and that the formerly consistent system of a given country 
undergoes not only a series of partial changes, but will in fact experience a "gestalt switch"  
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from one type to the other. The resulting new configuration of the elements of the system may 
be better or worse; one local optimum is replaced by another one.
43  
In both cases - that is in the case of partial reforms which only lead to a "restauration" and in 
the case of a complete transformation of the system's architecture - the task of monetary 
policymakers will be extremely difficult because of the transmission mechanism will have 
become instable. In such a situation the ECB would scarcely be able to predict the overall 
effects of its policy on the economy of "Euroland" and would therefore find it difficult to 
determine the precise strength of the monetary impulses which it should provide. There would 
be less of a chance of such a destabilisation and loss of orientation of monetary policymakers 
occurring in Europe as a consequence of changes in the national financial systems if different 
national currencies and monetary policies had been retained and not replaced by a unified 
currency regime; and under the old system of national monetary policies, such a 
destabilisation would have less serious consequences. I want to conclude by expressing my 
belief that this increased risk of instability and disorientation constitutes a bigger problem for 
a common currency than the need to design and implement a common monetary policy for 
different, but essentially stable, financial systems, on which the existing literature focuses.  
                                                 
43 In Schmidt/Spindler (1999) it is shown that, and why, there is a possibility that in the "competition" between 
different (consistent) national systems of corporate governance the one which is less efficient under stable 
conditions may be universally adopted.   
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Appendix 
 
Germany UK France
a) Capital Markets
Number of domestic listed shares (1997) 699 2,465 683
Market capitalization of shares related to GDP (1996) 22% 136% 30%
New listings between 1995 - 1997 60 765 109
Certificates of deposit as a percentage of GDP (1997) 0.32% 10% 18.1%
b) Banks
Market share as percentage 
of deposits by the non-bank public (1990)
Commercial Banks
1)  39.7% 56.7% 53.6%
Savings Banks 36.1% 3.4%
Co-operative and rural banks
2)
19.6% 42.7% 30.1%
5- firm concentration ratio of commercial banks (1995) 17% 57% 47%
Interest margin (1995) 2.66 2.21 1.66
Profit before tax (average 1990-94
 as percentage of balance sheet total) 0.55 0.66 0.06
c) Non-bank financial intermediaries
Private pension financing as percentage of GDP (1996) 5.8% 75.6% 4.5%
Pension funds portfolio composition (1996)
equities 8% 78% 14%
bonds 74% 14% 38%
property 7% 5% 8%
liquid assets 12% 4% 40%
Notes: 
1) For UK authorized banks; 
2) For UK building societies
Sources: Davis (1998); Wymeersch (1998); ECB (1999)
Table A1: Financial System Indicators: Financial Sectors 
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Germany UK France
a) Takeovers (1988- 1996) 4 1190 155
b) CEO compensation structure (1998)
Total remuneration (average) in US $ 398,430 645,540 520,389
Variable bonus as a percentage 
of annual basic compensation 27% 22% 19%
Options/ long-term incentive plans as a 
percentage of annual basic compensation 2% 38% 30%
c) Ownership concentration of 
     listed companies (1994-95)
Main shareholder  > 50% 68% 7% 37%
25-50% 21% 12% 32%
< 25% 11% 81% 31%
d) Share ownership structure (1995)
Private households/ Individuals 14.6% 20.3% 19.4%
Public sector 4.3% 0.8% 3.4%
Insurance companies 12.4% 21.9% 1.9%
Pension/ Investmentfunds 7.6% 36.6% 2.0%
Banks 10.3% 0.4% 4.0%
Enterprises/ commercial corporations 42.1% 1.1% 58.0%
Rest of the world 8.7% 16.3% 11.2%
Sources: Wymeersch (1998); Towers Perrin's 1998 Worldwide Total Remuneration report
Table A2: Financial System Indicators: Corporate Governance
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Germany UK France
a) Capital Markets
Number of domestic listed shares (1997) 699 2,465 683
Market capitalization of shares related to GDP (1996) 22% 136% 30%
New listings between 1995 - 1997 60 765 109
Certificates of deposit as a percentage of GDP (1997) 0.32% 10% 18.1%
b) Banks
Market share as percentage 
of deposits by the non-bank public (1990)
Commercial Banks
1)  39.7% 56.7% 53.6%
Savings Banks 36.1% 3.4%
Co-operative and rural banks
2) 19.6% 42.7% 30.1%
5- firm concentration ratio of commercial banks (1995) 17% 57% 47%
Interest margin (1995) 2.66 2.21 1.66
Profit before tax (average 1990-94
 as percentage of balance sheet total) 0.55 0.66 0.06
c) Non-bank financial intermediaries
Private pension financing as percentage of GDP (1996) 5.8% 75.6% 4.5%
Table A3: Financial System Indicators: Financial Sectors 
 
 